Paradoksalen je Lacanov dosežek, ki pa se navadno izmuzne tudi njegovim zagovornikom, s katerim je v imenu psihoanalize moderni dobi vrnil "dekontekstualizirano", racionalistično idejo subjekta. Spomnimo: ena od stalnic v sodobni ameriški prisvojitvi Heideggerja je poudarjati, kako je slednji skupaj z Wittgensteinom, Merleau-Pontyjem in drugimi izdelal konceptualno polje, ki omogoča, da se znebimo racionalistične ideje subjekta kot avtonomnega agenta, ki ločen od sveta kot kakšen računalnik obdeluje podatke, s katerimi ga oskrbljujejo čuti. Heideggerjev pojem "biti-v-svetu" napotuje k "vključenosti", ki je ni mogoče reducirati oziroma preseči, v konkretni in v ultimativno naključni življenjski svet: zmeraj že smo v svetu, delujemo v eksistencialnem projektu na ozadju, ki se izmika našemu dosegu in za vedno ostaja neznani horizont, v katerega smo "vrženi" kot končna bitja. In običajno na isti način interpretiramo tudi nasprotje med zavestjo in nezavednim: od telesa ločeni jaz predstavlja racionalno zavest, medtem ko je "nezavedno" sinonimno s temnim ozadjem, ki ga ne moremo v celoti obvladati, ker smo zmeraj že njegov del, ujeti vanj. ... Vendar pa Lacan z nezaslišano potezo trdi ravno nasprotno: freudovsko "nezavedno" nima popolnoma nič opraviti s strukturno nujno in ireduktibilno temo ozadja, življenjskega konteksta, v katerega smo, zmeraj že delujoči agenti, vključeni; "nezavedno" je v resnici od telesa ločeni racionalni stroj, ki nadaljuje svojo pot, ne ozirajoč se na zahteve subjektovega življenjskega okolja, nadomešča racionalni subjekt, dokler je ta "zunaj stika", v neskladju s svojim kontekstom: "nezavedno" je prelom, zaradi katerega subjektov prvobitni položaj ni položaj "biti-v-svetu". Na ta način dobimo tudi novo, nepričakovano rešitev starega fenomenološkega problema; kako je mogoče, da se subjekt loči od življenjskega sveta in samega sebe (zmotno) zaznava kot breztelesnega racionalnega agenta: do te ločitve lahko pride samo zato, ker je v subjektu že od samega začetka nekaj, kar se upira polni vključitvi v življenjski svet, in to "nekaj" je seveda nezavedno kot duševni stroj, ki ne upošteva zahtev "principa realnosti".
Slavoj Žižek: "I Hear You with My Eyes"; or, The Invisible Master, str. 90-126; v Renata Salecl & Slavoj Žižek (eds.): Gaze and Voice as Love Objects. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1996; str. 102-103.
__________________________________________________________________________________
The paradoxical achievement of Lacan, which usually passes unnoticed even with his advocates, is that, on behalf of psychoanalysis, he returns to the modern age, "decontextualized", rationalist notion of subject. Recall that one of the commonplaces of today's American appropriation of Heidegger is to emphasize how he, alongside with Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, and others, elaborated the conceptual network that enables us to get rid of the rationalist notion of subject as an autonomous agent who, excluded from the world, processes in a computerlike way data provided by the senses. Heidegger's notion of "being-in-the-world" points toward our irreducible and insurpassable "embeddedness" in a concrete and ultimately contingent life-world: we are always already in the world, engaged in existencial project whithin a background that eludes our grasp and remains forever the obscure horizon into which we are "thrown" as finite beings. And it is customary to interpret the opposition between consciousness and the unconscious along the same lines: the disembodied ego stands for rational consciousness, whereas the "unconscious" is synonymous with the opaque background that we cannot ever fully master, since we are always already part of it, caught in it. ... Lacan however, in an unheard-of gesture, claims the exact opposite: the Freudian "unconscious" has nothing whatsoever to do with the structurally necessary and irreducible opaqueness of the background, of the life context in which we, the always already engaged agents, are embedded; the "unconscious" is, rather, the disembodied rational machine that follows its path irrespective of the demands of the subjects life-world, it stands for rational subject insofar as it is originally "out of joint," in discord with its contextualized situation: "unconscious" is the rupture on account of which the subject's primordial stance is not that of "being-in-the-world". This way, one can also provide a new, unexpected solution to the old phenomenological problem of how it is possible for the subject to disengage itself from its life-world and (mis)perceive itself as a disembodied rational agent: this disengagement can only occur because there is from the very outset something in the subject that resists its full inclusion into its life-world context, and this "something", of course, is the unconscious as the psychic machine that disregards the requirements of the "reality principle".
Ni komentarjev:
Objavite komentar